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Abstract 
Purpose - Investigates the extent to which a client’s innovative effort affects the level of 
audit effort and whether the innovative-effort efficiency can attenuate the demand for greater 
audit effort associated with a client’s risky research-and-development (R&D) investments. 
Design/methodology/approach - We treat R&D expenditure as an input measure and the 
patent obtained/cited in a given year as an output measure of a firm’s innovative effort. We 
estimate innovation efficiency as the number of patents granted to a firm in a given year, 
scaled by its R&D capital. As a proxy for audit effort, we use audit fees. Combining firm-
year observations for fiscal years 2000 to 2010 from Compustat, patent data from the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office, and Audit Analytics provided a sample of 11,646 
observations from 2,051 unique firms. 
Findings - Results confirm that a client firm’s strategic emphasis on corporate innovations 
may require greater audit effort. However, we find evidence that the efficiency of a firm’s 
innovative effort can attenuate the demand for heightened audit effort against risky 
innovative efforts, implying that the external auditor’s role is not necessarily detrimental to 
corporate innovation, which suggests that the efficiency of a firm’s innovation effort lowers 
the client business risk perceived by an auditor related to corporate innovation. 
Originality/value - Contributes to a stream of literature identifying facilitators and 
impediments to corporate innovation. Our findings also complement an emerging body of 
literature on the effect of a firm’s business strategies on the auditor’s decision. Prior studies 
have not considered the input‒output conversion of a firm’s R&D expenditure as something 
that the firm values. By using the number of patents obtained and cited as an output measure 
of a firm’s innovative effort, we extend understanding of the influence of a firm’s business 
strategies on the level of audit effort. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we investigate the extent to which a client’s innovative effort affects the 
level of audit effort and whether the innovative-effort efficiency can attenuate the demand for 
greater audit effort associated with a client’s risky research-and-development (R&D) 
investments (Holmstrom, 1989). We define innovative effort as a firm’s strategic emphasis on 
corporate innovation that incorporates the conversion of R&D expenditure into knowledge 
assets such as patents.  
Corporate innovation is closely related to auditor’s risk of material misstatements and 
the audit risk for two reasons: complexity and uncertainty. First, the accounting for corporate 
innovation is complex with research and development arrangements (FASB ASC 730) and fair 
value measurement (FASB ASC 350). The auditor not only needs to verify the fair value of the 
corporate innovation, such as patents, initially, but also is mandated to perform impairment test 
subsequently (PCAOB AS 2502, AICPA AU 328). Second, while corporate innovation is a 
source of a firm’s competitiveness in the product market, a strategic emphasis on innovation 
and product differentiation may entail greater uncertainty and a more unstable information 
environment, thereby leading to higher business risk. According to Auditing Standards (AS 
2110 and AU-C 320), the auditor gathers the evidence to see if the company identifies its 
business risk and prepares processes to mitigate the risk. In regards this, the auditor needs to 
identify the business risk anticipated from unsuccessful corporate innovation, i.e. future 
deterioration of a client firm’s economic condition, and assess risk of material misstatements 
related to the corporate innovation. Moreover, the corporate innovation requires extensive 
professional judgment, partner, senior manager, and/or specialists are involved in the auditing 
to confirm the reasonableness of the assumptions and the fairness of the transactions.  
To the extent that an auditor recognizes the complexity and uncertainty, an increased 
risk of material misstatements arising from the firm’s innovative effort can be perceived as an 
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increased audit risk, requiring more competent auditors and greater audit effort (Bentley et al., 
2013; Godfrey and Hamilton, 2005; Johnstone, 2000; Stanley, 2011; Lobo et al. 2018). 
However, a firm’s greater ability to innovate, as demonstrated by a track record of successful 
R&D investments, can mitigate the business risk and increase firm value (Hirshleifer et al., 
2013). Higher efficiency in a firm’s innovative effort can signal its managerial ability, which 
affects financial reporting quality and auditor’s risk assessment (Demerjian et al., 2013; 
Krishnan and Wang, 2015). Nevertheless, prior studies on the auditor’s response to a client’s 
innovative effort have focused primarily on the intensity of a firm’s R&D expenditure and 
often failed to consider the innovation efficiency that can attenuate the uncertainty arising from 
risky R&D investments. To better understand an auditor’s response to corporate innovation, 
we investigate whether a firm’s innovative effort and innovation efficiency collectively affect 
the level of audit effort. We are motivated to study the relation between corporate innovation 
and the level of audit effort because an external auditor’s strict monitoring of long-term 
investments for corporate innovation may inadvertently lead to managers’ myopic decision-
making (Graham et al., 2005). From an auditor’s perspective, a client firm’s innovative effort 
may be linked to the risk of performance deterioration attributable to unsuccessful R&D 
investments and the threat of real earnings management due to its discretionary nature 
(Commerford et al., 2016; Roychowdhury, 2006). More conservative auditors may, therefore, 
increase their audit effort and restrict managers’ options in meeting short-term performance 
targets, which, unintentionally, impedes the client firm’s innovative effort (Chy and Hope, 
2018). However, a firm’s past ability in converting R&D expenditure into valuable knowledge 
assets can assuage an auditor’s concern for the client business risk attributable to risky R&D 
investments. Similarly, Krishnan and Wang (2015) suggested that an auditor perceives a lower 
audit risk from a firm with greater managerial ability, which is manifested by lower audit fees 
and a lower likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions. Considering these collectively, we 
3 
 
conjecture that, while a firm’s innovative effort demands heightened audit effort to mitigate 
greater client business risk, higher innovation efficiency would decrease the risk of material 
misstatements. 
In our empirical investigation, we treat R&D expenditure as an input measure and the 
patent obtained/cited in a given year as an output measure of a firm’s innovative effort (Gunny 
and Zhang, 2014; Koh and Reel, 2015). Following Hirshleifer et al. (2013), we estimate 
innovation efficiency as the number of patents granted to a firm in a given year, scaled by its 
R&D capital, measured as the past five years’ R&D expenditure, with 20% annual 
depreciation. As an alternative measure, we use the patents’ forward citation in lieu of the 
number of patents granted and re-estimated a firm’s innovation efficiency. As a proxy for audit 
effort, we use audit fees, consistent with prior literature (e.g. Bentley et al., 2013; Hackenbrack 
and Knechel, 1997). 
Using 11,646 firm-year observations from 2000 and 2010, we find that both measures 
of a firm’s innovative effort − R&D intensity and patent counts − are positively associated with 
audit fees. Our findings also indicate that high innovation efficiency, measured by the number 
of patents obtained or forward citation, scaled by R&D capital, is negatively associated with 
audit fees. Collectively, our results suggest that a firm’s innovation activities are perceived by 
auditors as an increased audit risk, requiring greater audit effort, whereas a firm’s innovation 
efficiency has a mitigating role on business risk. Our results are found to be robust through 
tests using a matched sample, by industry and size, and a two-stage least squares regression 
using industry peers’ patenting activity as the instrumental variable. In addition, we find that 
the positive relationship between R&D intensity and audit fees is attenuated by high analyst 
coverage, suggesting that the information intermediary role of analysts may have a similar 
positive effect of the risk-mitigation role played by innovation efficiency related to higher 
uncertainty arising from a firm’s innovative effort. However, the risk-mitigation effect of 
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analyst coverage is not observed for firms with high patent activity or high innovation 
efficiency, indicating that the relevance of analysts’ information role is limited to the audit 
pricing of R&D intensity.  
Our study makes two important contributions. First, we contribute to a stream of 
literature identifying facilitators and impediments to corporate innovation. Prior studies have 
identified several obstacles to corporate innovation, including corporate taxes (Mukherjee et 
al., 2017), banking-sector distress (Nanda and Nicholas, 2014), the threat of hostile takeovers 
(Atanassov, 2013), and accounting conservatism (Chang et al., 2015). While Chy and Hope 
(2018) find that conservative auditors’ scrutiny of a firm’s financial reporting may impede 
corporate innovation by inducing managers’ myopic decisions, it is not known whether the 
auditor’s inclination for heightened audit effort is tempered by the client firm’s innovation 
efficiency. Our results corroborate that a client firm’s strategic emphasis on corporate 
innovations may require greater audit effort to provide reasonable assurance in its financial 
reporting (Bentley et al., 2013; Godfrey and Hamilton, 2005). However, we also provide 
evidence suggesting that the efficiency of a firm’s innovative effort can attenuate the demand 
for heightened audit effort against risky innovative efforts. This implies that the role of the 
external auditor is not necessarily detrimental to corporate innovation. Rather, our findings 
suggest that the efficiency of a firm’s innovation effort lowers the client business risk perceived 
by an auditor related to corporate innovation. Second, our findings complement an emerging 
literature on the effect of a firm’s business strategies on the auditor’s decision. Although prior 
studies, using Miles and Snow’s (1978) typology of business strategies, have included the 
intensity of R&D expenditure as a component of a firm’s business strategy (e.g. Bentley et al., 
2013; Bentley-Goode et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017), they have not considered the input‒output 
conversion of a firm’s R&D expenditure as something that the firm values. By using the 
number of patents obtained as an output measure of a firm’s innovative effort, we extend the 
5 
 
findings of Bentley et al. (2013) on the influence of a firm’s business strategies on the level of 
audit effort.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review and develops 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and empirical models used in our study. Section 4 
reports the empirical results, which is followed by concluding remarks in section 5. 
 
2. Related literature and hypotheses development 
The economic theory of endogenous growth suggests that technological innovation is 
an “engine of growth” (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). According to Accenture’s (2016) 
survey of corporate executives, more than 80% of executives believe that their firms’ long-
term strategies are highly dependent on corporate innovation. In line with this strategic 
importance given to corporate innovation, a large body of accounting and finance literature has 
documented that corporate innovative activities, such as R&D, are associated with future sales 
growth and profitability improvement, thereby leading to an increase in firm value (e.g. Ali et 
al., 2012; Chan et al., 2001; Eberhart et al., 2004;. Lev and Sougiannis, 1996). Recently, 
considerable literature has investigated several factors affecting corporate innovation, 
including corporate taxes (Mukherjee et al., 2017), CEO’s personal risk-taking attitude (Sunder 
et al., 2017), banking development (Amore et al., 2013), strong corporate governance 
(Atanassov, 2013), and accounting conservatism (Chang et al., 2015).  
In addition to these external constraints, the extent of a firm’s innovative effort is 
shaped by its competitive strategy, balancing exploitation of existing knowledge and more 
radical exploration/innovation (Benner and Tushman, 2003). Prior studies have suggested that 
auditors respond to their client’s business strategy by adjusting the level of audit effort or the 
likelihood of issuing control weakness or going-concern opinions (Bentley et al., 2013; 
Bentley-Goode et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017). 
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2.1 Client’s business strategy and audit effort 
For the planning of an audit engagement, audit standards require that an auditor obtain 
sufficient understanding of a client’s business, environment, and its strategies that may affect 
the risk of material misstatement (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants  
(AICPA), 2006) [1]. Miles and Snow (1978) categorize four distinct business strategies to 
respond to changing competitive environment: prospectors; defenders; analyzers; and reactors. 
Prospectors are firms that remain as pioneers in product and market developments and intend 
to maintain their competitive position by pursuing aggressive corporate innovation. By 
contrast, defenders commit little toward corporate innovation and product development. 
Rather, they compete based on the price or quality of their products. Analyzers follow an 
intermediate strategy between prospector and defender, whereas reactors do not have a 
coherent competitive strategy but provide impromptu responses to external forces (Hambrick, 
1983).     
Following Miles and Snow’s (1978) typology, Bentley et al. (2013) develop a measure 
capturing the inclination of a firm’s business strategy toward that of prospector and find that 
the firms are inclined to follow a prospector strategy showed a higher likelihood of financial 
misreporting (such as SEC’s AAER enforcement, shareholder lawsuits, or financial 
restatements) and auditors correspondingly exert greater audit effort and charge higher audit 
fees to compensate for higher auditor business risk arising from the client’s business strategy. 
In addition, it has been documented that the innovation-oriented prospector strategy is 
associated with a higher likelihood of disclosing internal control material weakness (ICMW) 
and issuing a going-concern opinion (Bentley-Goode et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2017). Taken 
together, the empirical evidence suggests that an auditor who perceives higher risk in a client 
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following an innovative prospector strategy exerts greater audit effort and charges higher audit 
fees (Bell et al., 2008; Bentley et al., 2013). 
 
2.2 Innovative effort and audit effort 
Business strategies embody a firm’s reliance on technological innovation to remain 
competitive in the market. For instance, a firm following a prospector strategy strives to 
develop innovative products and promote new markets whereas those following a defender 
strategy focus on production efficiency and cost minimization as a source of competitiveness 
(Bentley et al., 2013; Miles and Snow, 1978). Notably, a key functional attribute differentiating 
the prospector strategy from other business strategies is the commitment to corporate 
innovation and technological leadership (Hambrick et al., 1983). 
While a firm’s innovative effort is regarded as a source of future sales growth and 
profitability improvement, R&D is a risky investment by nature and accompanied by greater 
uncertainty regarding its success and the firm’s future profitability (Kothari et al., 2002). 
Compared to the intensity of a firm’s R&D expenditure, the patents obtained and cited are 
deemed less noisy and more reliable because they are outputs of successful R&D investments 
(Gunny and Zheng, 2014; Hall et al., 2005; Lin et al., 2006). Brown and Kimbrough (2011) 
suggest that patents provide a legal protection for R&D activities, resulting in a more positive 
effect on future earnings than R&D expenditure. Nevertheless, both R&D expenditure and the 
patents incorporate a client firm’s business risk arising from its innovative strategy. Although 
patents are intellectual properties providing an exclusive right to the patented technologies, 
information about the patented technologies is costly to process and the likelihood of its 
commercialization is difficult to assess (Hirshleifer et al., 2013). Therefore, both R&D 
expenditure and the patents can signal the uncertainty of a client’s future prospects related to 
its innovative strategy and lead to higher audit fees to compensate for heightened audit effort. 
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To test this conjecture on the relation between innovative effort and audit fees, we propose our 
first hypothesis as follows:  
H1a: A firm’s R&D intensity is positively associated with audit fees. 
H1b: The number of patent obtained (cited) by a firm is positively associated with audit 
fees. 
 
2.3 Innovation efficiency and audit effort 
Despite both larger R&D expenditure and more patents obtained requiring greater audit 
effort, higher efficiency in converting R&D expenditure into patents would assuage the 
uncertainty embedded in a firm’s innovative effort. Hirshleifer et al. (2013) document that 
innovation efficiency, measured by the ratio of the number of patents to R&D capital, is 
positively associated with future returns, suggesting incremental information benefits from 
innovation efficiency. 
Regarding the information role of an organization’s operational efficiency, Demerjian 
et al. (2013) show that higher efficiency attributable to a firm’s top management team in 
converting production inputs (e.g. cost of goods sold, net PP&E, and R&D expenditure) into a 
firm’s sales revenue is positively associated with earnings quality. To the extent that superior 
managers’ greater knowledge and better judgments enable higher efficiency in revenue 
generation, an auditor may perceive the higher efficiency as a factor lowering audit risk and 
accordingly reduce the audit effort (Krishnan and Wang, 2014). Similarly, we expect that 
higher efficiency in obtaining patents reflects the firm’s greater ability in implementing its 
innovative strategies, thereby reducing the need for audit effort. To test this conjecture, we 
propose our second hypothesis as follows: 
H2: Innovation efficiency is negatively associated with audit fees. 
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3. Data and empirical model 
3.1 Sample 
We construct our initial sample of firm-year observations using Compustat for fiscal 
years between 2000 to 2010. After removing utilities and financial industries from our initial 
sample, we obtain 55,906 firm-year observations without missing information for our variables 
calculation. We remove penny stocks and small firms with a share price of less than US$1 or 
total assets less than US$100 million. We add the patent data from the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) compiled by Kogan et al. (2017) [2]. The patent dataset provides 
information about the annual patent number and patent citation. For our sample period, the 
patent dataset includes 16,046 firm-year observations. We then merge our dataset, using Audit 
Analytics, to collect audit engagement information such as audit fees and auditor attributes. 
After deleting the observations with missing values, our final sample containes 11,646 
observations from 2,051 unique firms. Our sample selection procedure is summarized in Tables 
I. Sample distribution by industry illustrated in Table II shows that more than half of the sample 
firms belong to the industries of business equipment (40%) and manufacturing (22%). 
<INSERT TABLES I and II> 
 
3.2 Measurement of corporate innovation 
Following prior literature on corporate innovation, we use two proxies for a firm’s 
innovative effort: R&D intensity; and the patents granted. As an input measure of innovative 
effort, we use R&D intensity (R&D), where R&D expense is scaled by market capitalization. 
As an output measure of innovative effort, we use the natural log of the number of patents 
granted in a given year.  
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Similar to Hirshleifer et al. (2013), we define innovation efficiency (IE) as the number 
of patents granted, scaled by R&D capital, where R&D capital is calculated as the five-year 
cumulative R&D expenses, assuming a 20% depreciation rate, as follows: 
Innovation Efficiency (IE) = Patent countt / (R&Dt-2 + 0.8*R&Dt-3 + 0.6*R&Dt-4 + 0.4*R&Dt-
5 + 0.2*R&Dt-6 )                                                           (1) 
Since the number of patents does not incorporate the full extent of innovative effort and the 
size of the R&D projects, we also use the patents’ adjusted forward citation number as the 
numerator in the equation (1). This measure represents the input‒output conversion efficiency 
between our two proxies for innovative effort, assuming that more recent R&D expenditure 
contributes to the current generation of knowledge assets more directly.  
 
3.3 Empirical model  
Hay et al. (2006) conclude that most audit-fee models in the extant literature consider 
client attributes (such as size, complexity, inherent risk, profitability, internal control, and 
leverage) and auditor attributes (such as auditor quality and auditor tenure). Building on Hay 
et al.’s (2006) framework, we construct the following regression model with our measures of 
corporate innovation, innovative effort (R&D intensity and the number of patents granted), and 
innovation efficiency:  
lnAUDITFEE = β0 + β1R&D +β2lnPATENT (or lnCITE) + β3IE_PATENT (or 
IE_CITE) + β4ROA + β5SIZE+ β6Leverage+β7M/B+ β8QUICKRATIO 
+ β9INHERENT + β10LOSS + β11ICMW + β12BIG4 + β13New Auditor+ 
∑βYear + ∑βIndustry + ε 
 
(2) 
 
The dependent variable is the natural log of audit fees. Our variables of interests are R&D 
intensity (R&D), the number of patents granted (lnPATENT), and innovation efficiency (IE). 
To the extent that a client firm’s innovative effort entails an increase in its business risk, we 
conjecture that audit fees would be positively associated with the proxies for innovative effort, 
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R&D and lnPATENT. In addition, to the extent that a firm’s higher innovation efficiency 
reflects greater managerial ability, mitigating the embedded risk of innovative effort, we 
conjecture that an auditor may assess the client business risk lower, leading to a negative 
association between the proxies for IE and audit fees. 
Following Hay et al. (2016), our control variables include several client attributes, such 
as client size, profitability, audit complexity, and the inherent and control risks of the client. 
Our proxy for client size is the total assets (SIZE), which is expected to be positively associated 
with audit fees. For profitability, we control for return on assets (ROA), quick ratio 
(QUICKRATIO), and a dichotomous variable showing a loss year (LOSS). While the 
coefficients of ROA and QUICKRATIO are expected to be negative, indicating that higher 
profitability signals lower client’s business risk, Loss is expected to have a positive coefficient. 
Variables that represent audit complexity include the ratio of inventory and receivable to total 
assets (INHERENT) and market-to-book ratio (M/B), both of which are expected to be 
positively associated with audit fees. To the extent that a higher risk of financial distress 
increases audit risk, we expect to see a positive coefficient for leverage (Leverage). As 
Raghunandan and Rama (2006) document, the existence of internal control material weak 
(ICMW) is expected to be positively associated with audit fees. To control for auditor attributes, 
we add an indicator variable representing Big-4 auditing firms (BIG4) and a dichotomous 
variable indicating an auditor change (New Auditor). As Carson et al. (2012) illustrate, we 
expect an audit-fee premium for Big-4 auditors and, accordingly, a positive coefficient for 
BIG4. Consistent with the practice of fee discounting on initial audit engagements (i.e. 
“lowballing”), we expect to see a negative coefficient for New Auditor. A detailed description 
of the variables is presented in the Appendix.      
 
4. Empirical results 
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4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table III shows the descriptive statistics. The mean value of the log of audit fees is 
14.035 (equivalent to about US$1.25 million), which is comparable to previous studies (e.g. 
Bentley et al., 2013; Krishnan and Wang, 2015; Stanley, 2011). The mean value of R&D 
intensity is 5.8% of market capitalization and the mean value of patent counts after log 
transformation was 1.579 (equivalent to about 4.85 patents). The two innovation-efficiency 
measures show that, on average, one patent (one citation) required US$11 million (US$4.65 
million) cumulative R&D investments over the five years, after amortizing the investment by 
20% per year. Since we exclude small firms from our sample, the average size of logged total 
assets (6.894) is slightly higher than that of other studies. Consistent with prior literature, our 
sample demonstrate the dominance of Big-4 auditors (89.3%). In addition, the average firm in 
our sample shows an average return on assets of 2.1%, leverage of 0.154, a market-to-book 
ratio of 2.911, a quick ratio of 2.600, and a ratio of inventory and accounting receivable to total 
assets of 0.251. Auditor change and auditor’s disclosure of internal control material weakness 
occurrs in 13.0% and 5.3% of out sample, respectively. 
<INSERT TABLE III> 
 
Table IV presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations among our variables. Notably, 
our two output measures of innovative effort (lnPATENT and lnCITE) are highly correlated to 
each other, whereas their correlation with an input measure (R&D) has a lower magnitude, 
which suggests that our input and output measures of innovative effort may capture different 
dimensions of a firm’s innovative effort. By construction, our two measure of innovation 
efficiency (IE_PATENT and IE_CITE) are positively correlated with patent counts and 
negatively correlated with R&D investments. 
<INSERT TABLE IV> 
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4.2 Test of hypotheses 
Table V shows the main testing results. Across all models, our proxies for a firm’s 
innovative effort are positively related to audit fees. All models are significant at p<0.01, with 
adjusted R2 of about 0.80. As a baseline, we first estimate restrictive models of audit fees using 
only our proxies for innovative effort. When the patent count (lnPATENT) is used as an output 
measure of innovative effort in addition to R&D intensity (R&D) as an input measure in Model 
1, we find that both variables have a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% significance 
level, suggesting that our input and output measures may capture different dimensions of a 
firm’s innovative effort, thereby leading to a significant influence on audit fees independent 
from each other. Control variables are significant at the 1% level in the expected direction, 
except for Leverage and M/B (though Leverage was significant at 10% level). We also find the 
consistent result from using the citation count (lnCITE) as an alternative output measure of 
innovative effort in the Model 2. These results are consistent with our prediction that auditors 
tend to charge higher audit fees for the clients engaging more in innovative activities. Therefore, 
both H1a and H1b are supported. 
<INSERT TABLE V> 
 
To test H2, we extend our models in Models 1 and 2 to Models 3 and 4 respectively 
(see Table V) and include a measure of innovation efficiency based on patent count 
(IE_PATENT) and patent citation (IE_CITE). In Model 3, when innovation efficiency is 
measured by the ratio between the number of patents and R&D capital, the coefficient of 
IE_PATENT is negatively significant at the 1% level while the coefficients of our innovative 
effort measures remain positive. In Model 4, when innovation efficiency is measured by the 
ratio between patent citation and R&D capital, we also find that the coefficient of IE_CITE is 
14 
 
negatively significant at the 1% level, lending support to H2. The findings imply that an auditor 
may assess a client’s business risk as low and reduce the audit effort when a client firm 
demonstrates higher efficiency in converting risky R&D investments into patents that are 
legally protected knowledge assets. This suggests that an auditor may perceive a client firm’s 
greater managerial ability regarding corporate innovation as a factor mitigating the innate risk 
embedded in the firm’s innovative effort.  
Our findings also show economic significance. In Model 3, for instance, the coefficients 
of 0.558 for R&D and 0.045 for lnPATENT imply that one standard deviation increase in R&D 
intensity and the number of patents obtained in a given year would increase audit fees by 3.5% 
and 6.5%, respectively, equivalent to US$43,111 and $80,845 fee increases at the mean of our 
sample [3]. Meanwhile, one standard deviation increase in IE_PATENT is associated with 4% 
lower audit fees, or US$49,150 fee reduction at the mean, illustrating a significant attenuation 
of client business risk arising from risky innovative investments. 
 
4.3 Matched sample approach 
Early literature on innovation has argued that the intensity of a firm’s innovative 
activities is affected by the firm size and industry-level innovative effort (e.g. Audretsch and 
Acs, 1991; Cohen and Klepper, 1992). In particular, Bound et al. (1984) reported that patenting 
activities are concentrated in industries, including chemical, drugs, computer equipment, and 
communications. To the extent that the influence of firm size and industry-level factors is not 
fully controlled in our models, the uneven distribution of innovative activities across firms may 
cause a bias in the results. To corroborate our findings, we conduct a matched sample analysis 
by separating our sample into high and innovation efficiency sub-samples, based on annual 
industry median and then matching based on the asset size and industry. Table VI presents the 
results from using a matched sample. In the restrictive Models 1 and 2, our input-based measure 
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of innovative effort, R&D intensity, is positively associated with audit fees at the 1% 
significance level, though patent-based output measures became insignificant at the 
conventional significance level. However, after fully specifying our model with the measures 
of innovation efficiency, we find in Models 3 and 4 that both innovative effort variables are 
positively related to audit fees and innovation efficiency measures are negatively associated 
with audit fees, consistent with our findings from our audit fee test summarized in Table V.  
<INSERT TABLE VI> 
 
4.4 Endogeneity 
Even though we control for various audit risk factors affecting audit pricing to identify 
the influence of corporate innovation on audit fees, we cannot rule out that the relationship 
between audit fees and a firm’s innovative effort could be driven by correlated omitted factors. 
To alleviate this potential endogeneity issue, we use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression model. 
In the first stage, we regress R&D intensity (R&D) and the number of patents granted 
(lnPATENT) on the control variables representing various audit risk factors and adopt the 
industry mean of the number of patents granted as our instrumental variable. As Larcker and 
Rusticus (2010) emphasize, the validity of our 2SLS results relies on the use of an appropriate 
instrumental variable correlated with our endogenous variables of corporate innovation but 
uncorrelated with the error in our audit fee model. We define two-digit SIC (SIC2) as the 
boundary of an industry and used the industry mean of patents granted as our instrumental 
variable in the first-stage regression model. The industry mean of patents granted is highly 
correlated with a firm’s R&D intensity and the number of patents granted but not related to 
residuals of pre-instrumented audit fee regressions. This rejects the conventional weak 
instrument tests and meets the exclusion criterion.  
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In the second stage, we regress audit fees on the fitted value from the first-stage 
regression and other control variables that are used in the main testing model from Table V. 
Table VII presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 show the result of first-stage regression. The 
coefficients for the industry mean of patents granted are positive and statistically significant, 
supporting that the industry peers’ patenting activities are correlated with our endogenous 
corporate innovation variables. Columns 3 and 4 show the results from the second-stage 
regression. Consistent with our main testing results, the coefficients on the instrumental 
variables for R&D intensity and patents granted are positive and statistically significant. Taken 
together, these results support our prediction that a firm’s innovative effort has a positive effect 
on audit efforts.      
<INSERT TABLE VII> 
 
4.5 Additional test 
Research has suggested that firms with higher R&D intensity and intangible assets tend 
to have more analyst coverage and greater value relevance of recommendations (Barron et al., 
2002; Barth et al., 2001; Palmon and Yezegel, 2012). In essence, analysts contribute to 
identifying the value of the firms with high intangible assets by lowering information 
asymmetry and relating firms’ innovation efforts with future value creation. This external 
monitoring of security analysts can also affect a firm’s accruals management and real activities 
manipulation decisions (Yu, 2008; Irani and Oesch, 2016). In line with the notion of external 
monitoring role of analysts, PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2110 requires an auditor to 
consider client-related information in analysts’ reports to better understand the client’s business 
(PCAOB, 2010). As such, we supplement our examination on auditor response to corporate 
innovation by assessing the moderating effect of analysts’ external monitoring on the 
relationship between innovation and audit fees. 
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To the extent that analysts’ external monitoring enriches a firm’s information 
environment and thereby assists an auditor’s assessment of client business risk, we conjecture 
that analysts’ monitoring would attenuate the auditor’s risk pricing of a client’s innovative 
activities. To test this moderating effect, we adopt the number of analysts following as our 
proxy for the analysts’ monitoring and interact it with our variables of interest, representing 
both innovative effort and innovation efficiency. Specifically, we use decile ranks of analyst 
coverage, denoted by Anal.Cov., with the ranking, performed by year. Table VIII presents the 
results of estimating the same audit models we use above, augmented by Anal.Cov. and its 
interactions. As we predict, we find significantly negative coefficients for the interaction 
variables between analyst coverage and R&D intensity (R&D × Anal.Cov.) across all models. 
This finding suggests that an auditor may perceive that the uncertainties in the client firm’s 
future economic condition arising from risky innovative effort can be mitigated by analysts’ 
external monitoring, which discourages extreme risk-taking by the firm. Notably, we fail to 
find a significant association between our patent-based measures of innovative effort and 
Anal.Cov. We conjecture that this inconsistency with our prediction may occur because the 
auditor’s response to the information role of analysts following is concentrated on its audit 
pricing of an input measure of innovative effort rather than more observable output measures 
such as patent counts.  
  
5. Conclusion  
Motivated by the growing importance of technological innovation in management 
practice and research, we explore the auditor’s response to corporate innovation by examining 
the relationship among a firm’s innovative effort, innovation efficiency, and audit fees. Our 
findings lead us to argue that auditors tend to charge higher audit fees for the clients with higher 
innovative activities, proxied by R&D intensity and the number of patents granted. The results 
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suggest that auditors are more likely to perceive a firm’s innovative activities as client business 
risks that require more audit efforts, thereby leading to higher audit fees being charged. We 
also find that auditors charged lower audit fees when client firms show greater innovation 
efficiency, measured by the number of patents granted (and forward citation), scaled by the 
capitalized R&D expenditures. This finding indicates that auditors tend to consider the 
efficiency of a firm’s innovation activities as a risk-mitigating factor that they may lower the 
demand for audit efforts. Overall, our findings suggest that, while an auditor would respond to 
a client’s risky investments to innovative activities by increasing the audit effort, the client’s 
innovation efficiency may temper the auditor’s response to innovative effort by signaling the 
client’s greater risk-management ability in converting R&D expenditure into the creation of 
valuable knowledge assets. 
As an extension to our main tests, we test the effect of analyst coverage and firms’ 
innovation activities on audits fees to assess what effect the information environment has on 
auditors in evaluating client firms’ innovation activities. The findings indicate that an enhanced 
information environment, proxied by high analyst coverage, for client firms with high R&D 
intensity plays a positive role in reducing audit fees, suggesting that auditors view analyst 
coverage as a risk-mitigating factor for a client’s business risk attributable to its corporate 
innovation. Further, the insignificant effect of analyst coverage and innovation efficiency on 
audit fees suggests that the risk-mitigating effect of innovation efficiency on audit fees is more 
pronounced in a high-information-asymmetry environment.  
 
Notes 
1. AU Section 314.29 states that “The auditor should obtain an understanding of the 
entity’s objectives and strategies, and related business risks that may result in material 
misstatement of the financial statements. … the entity’s management or those charged 
with governance define objectives, which are the overall plans for the entity. 
Strategies are the operational approaches by which management intends to achieve its 
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objectives.” Currently, the same requirement is stipulated in PCAOB Audit Standard 
2110: Identifying and Assessing Risks of Material Misstatement (PCAOB, 2010). 
2. We use patent data provided by Noah Stoffman covering all patents granted by 
USPTO until 2010. The dataset is available at https://iu.app.box.com/patents . 
3. Since R&D and lnPATENT are measured by different units (i.e., dollar versus count), 
we first calculate their standardized coefficients by multiplying OLS coefficients by 
standard deviation of the predictors and divide them by the standard deviation of 
outcome variable, lnAUDITFEE. Our calibration of the economic significance is 
performed by multiplying the standardized coefficients to the mean of unlogged audit 
fees representing the impact of one standard deviation change of the predictors on the 
audit fees in U.S. dollar. 
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Appendix 
 
Variable definitions. 
 
Variable  Description (Compustat mnemonic in brackets) 
lnAUDITFEE 
 
Natural log of total audit fee of the year (AUDIT_FEES in Audit 
Analytics database). 
R&D  R&D expense deflated by market capitalization. 
lnPATENT  Natural log of the number of patents obtained. 
lnCITE 
 
Natural log of the number of patent citation. 
IE_PATENT 
 
Number of patents obtained deflated by R&D capital where R&D 
capital is calculated as R&Dt-2+0.8*R&Dt-3+0.6*R&Dt-4+0.4*R&Dt-
5+0.2*R&Dt-6. 
IE_CITE 
 
Number of patent citations deflated by R&D capital. 
SIZE  The natural logarithm of total assets (AT). 
ROA  Income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by prior year’s total 
assets (AT) 
Leverage  Long-term debt divided by total assets (DLTT/AT). 
M/B 
 
Market-to-book ratio measured as market capitalization 
(CSHO*PRCC_F) divided by the book value of equity (CEQ). 
Inherent 
 
Inventory and receivables divided by total assets ((INVT+REC)/AT). 
QuickRatio 
 
Ratio of current assets minus inventories to current liabilities ((ACT–
INVT)/LCT). 
LOSS  Equal to one if a firm reports negative income before extraordinary 
items, zero otherwise (1 if IB<0, 0 otherwise). 
ICMW 
 
Equal to one if auditor’s opinion on firm’s internal control is weak and 
zero otherwise. 
BIG4 
 
Equal to one if a firm uses Big 4/5/6/8 auditors, zero otherwise (1 if 
AU is 1 to 8, 0 otherwise).  
New Auditor 
 
Equal to one if a firm has an auditor tenure of two or fewer years, zero 
otherwise. 
Anal. Cov. 
 
Analyst coverage as calculated by the decile rank of analysts following 
by year. 
Note: All continuous variables are winsorized by each year for top and bottom 1%.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table I. Sample selection. 
 
 Obs. 
Compustat data for years between 2000 and 2010 without missing information 55,906 
LESS: small firms with a share price of less than US$1 or total assets less than US$100 
million 
(26,699) 
LESS: missing values after merging with Audit Analytics (17,561) 
Total observations 11,646 
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Table II. Sample distribution by industry. 
 
Industry Description Obs. Percent 
Business equipment Computers, software, and electronic equipment 4,603 40 
Manufacturing Machinery, trucks, planes, office furniture, paper, commercial printing 2,561 22 
Healthcare Healthcare, medical equipment, and drugs 1,838 16 
Chemical Chemicals and allied products 667 6 
Consumer durables Cars, TVs, furniture, household appliances 569 5 
Consumer non-durables Food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, leather, toys 460 4 
Other Mines, construction, building materials, transportation, hotels 457 4 
Energy Oil, gas, and coal extraction and products 259 2 
Wholesale Retail, repair, and other services 232 2 
Total  11,646 100 
 
 
Table III. Descriptive statistics for included variables. 
 
Variable N  Mean   Std.      0.250   Median      0.750  
lnAUDITFEE 11,646     14.038       1.211      13.194      13.959     14.816  
R&D  11,646      0.058       0.075       0.013       0.033       0.072  
lnPATENT 11,646      1.581       1.746       0.000        1.099       2.639  
lnCITE 11,646      1.979       2.048       0.000        1.609       3.364  
IE_PATENT 11,646      0.090       0.168       0.000         0.026       0.108  
IE_CITE 11,646      0.214       0.459       0.000         0.051       0.222  
ROA 11,646      0.021       0.153      -0.014      0.045       0.094  
SIZE 11,646      6.895       1.669       5.540       6.585       7.920  
Leverage 11,646      0.154       0.176       0.000       0.107       0.248  
M/B 11,646      2.907       3.444       1.410       2.238       3.628  
QUICKRATIO 11,646      2.603       2.689       1.119       1.694       2.981  
INHERENT 11,646      0.251       0.142       0.144       0.242       0.338  
LOSS 11,646      0.288       0.453       0.000         0.000         1.000  
ICMW 11,646      0.053       0.224       0.000         0.000         0.000    
BIG4 11,646      0.892       0.310       1.000       1.000       1.000  
New Auditor 11,646      0.130       0.337       0.000         0.000         0.000   
FOROPS 11,646      0.464       0.499       0.000         0.000         1.000  
AUD_LAG 11,646      4.056       0.435       3.871       4.094       4.304  
N_SEG 11,646     16.260       8.934       9.000      15.000      22.000  
EXPERT 11,646      0.232       0.118       0.162       0.221       0.302  
 
Notes: Variables are as defined in the Appendix. To control for the small-size-firm effect, 
we restricted our sample to: firm’s audit fees (AUDIT_FEES) higher than US$10,000; total 
assets (AT) at least US$100 million; and stockholders’ equity (SET) at least US$1 million. 
To control for the penny stock, we restricted our sample to firms with a stock price at fiscal 
year end (PRCC_F) of at least $1. Firm-years not reporting any R&D expense (XRD) were 
treated as zero.  
 
  
Table IV. Correlations: Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 lnAUDITFEE  -0.08 0.42 0.38 -0.05 -0.08 0.17 0.80 0.12 0.03 -0.39 0.05 -0.19 0.08 0.22 -0.14 0.22 0.14 0.46 0.25 
2 R&D  -0.10  0.14 0.15 -0.05 -0.04 -0.42 -0.17 0.05 -0.18 0.08 -0.09 0.42 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.05 -0.10 -0.04 
3 lnPATENT 0.32 0.25  0.98 0.42 0.36 0.03 0.51 0.00 0.08 -0.03 -0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.15 -0.10 0.08 -0.17 0.25 0.14 
4 lnCITE 0.30 0.25 0.99  0.44 0.42 0.02 0.46 -0.02 0.09 -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 -0.05 0.15 -0.10 0.07 -0.18 0.22 0.13 
5 IE_PATENT 0.07 0.13 0.85 0.84  0.88 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.03 -0.01 
6 IE_CITE 0.07 0.15 0.84 0.86 0.98  0.00 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 
7 ROA 0.16 -0.46 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.01  0.22 -0.15 0.14 -0.14 0.18 -0.69 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.18 0.03 
8 SIZE 0.76 -0.22 0.39 0.37 0.12 0.11 0.23  0.17 0.07 -0.30 -0.07 -0.25 -0.08 0.24 -0.12 0.14 -0.11 0.46 0.29 
9 Leverage 0.24 -0.10 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.13 0.35  -0.02 -0.15 -0.05 0.11 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.07 
10 M/B 0.09 -0.26 0.15 0.16 0.07 0.08 0.39 0.13 -0.03  0.02 -0.09 -0.11 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 0.01 
11 QUICKRATIO -0.41 0.20 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.11 -0.02 -0.39 -0.38 0.05  -0.40 0.15 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.05 -0.28 -0.11 
12 INHERENT 0.07 -0.12 -0.08 -0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.15 -0.03 0.05 -0.11 -0.36  -0.17 0.01 -0.11 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.20 -0.04 
13 LOSS -0.20 0.40 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.78 -0.26 0.04 -0.22 0.10 -0.19  0.08 -0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.08 -0.18 -0.06 
14 ICMW 0.09 0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.08  -0.06 0.05 0.04 0.25 -0.03 -0.05 
15 BIG4 0.22 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.26 0.09 0.08 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 -0.06  -0.20 0.04 -0.05 0.09 0.54 
16 New Auditor -0.14 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.13 -0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.20  0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.16 
17 FOROPS 0.22 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.01 -0.06 -0.09 0.11 -0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02  0.14 0.20 0.04 
18 AUD_LAG 0.06 0.05 -0.20 -0.19 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.22 -0.06 -0.16 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.25 -0.09 0.07 0.12  -0.02 -0.07 
19 N_SEG 0.44 -0.11 0.20 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.45 0.16 -0.04 -0.29 0.24 -0.19 -0.03 0.09 -0.03 0.21 -0.06  0.16 
20 EXPERT 0.24 -0.03 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.26 0.07 0.03 -0.10 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.49 -0.15 0.05 -0.07 0.15  
Notes: All variables are as defined in the Appendix. The values in boldface indicate a significance level of less than 5%. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table V. The effect of corporate innovation on audit fees. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AFEE AFEE AFEE AFEE 
R&D 0.625*** 0.630*** 0.509*** 0.528*** 
 (4.87) (4.94) (3.98) (4.15) 
lnPATENT 0.0266**  0.0454***                 
 (3.29)  (5.00)                 
lnCITE  0.0225***  0.0361*** 
  (3.42)  (4.89) 
IE_PATENT   -0.281***  
   (-4.32)  
IE_CITE    -0.0903*** 
    (-4.14)    
ROA -0.246*** -0.245*** -0.254*** -0.250*** 
 (-3.54) (-3.52) (-3.66) (-3.60)    
Size 0.520*** 0.521*** 0.509*** 0.512*** 
 (54.06) (55.62) (49.80) (51.74) 
Leverage 0.113 0.114 0.123* 0.119*   
 (1.86) (1.88) (2.04) (1.97) 
MB 0.00378 0.00372 0.0032 0.00334 
 (1.73) (1.70) (1.47) (1.53) 
Quick Ratio -0.0434*** -0.0434*** -0.0428*** -0.0428*** 
 (-10.85) (-10.86) (-10.79) (-10.80)    
Inherent 0.754*** 0.760*** 0.754*** 0.760*** 
 (7.86) (7.91) (7.89) (7.94) 
Loss 0.0267 0.0269 0.0242 0.0258 
 (1.30) (1.31) (1.18) (1.26) 
ICMW 0.450*** 0.449*** 0.453*** 0.453*** 
 (13.73) (13.70) (13.82) (13.82) 
Big4 0.0729* 0.0717* 0.0703* 0.0703*   
 (2.07) (2.03) (2.01) (2.01) 
NewAuditor -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.121*** -0.120*** 
 (-4.95) (-4.93) (-4.80) (-4.78)    
FOROPS 0.0376 0.0375 0.0387 0.0384 
 (1.90) (1.89) (1.96) (1.94) 
AUD_LAG 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 
 (4.49) (4.54) (4.66) (4.69) 
N_SEG 0.0106*** 0.0107*** 0.0105*** 0.0106*** 
 (7.66) (7.71) (7.61) (7.64) 
EXPERT 0.441*** 0.441*** 0.439*** 0.440*** 
 (4.48) (4.49) (4.48) (4.49) 
Constant 8.545*** 8.528*** 8.631*** 8.598*** 
 (64.75) (65.03) (64.42) (64.83) 
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 11,646 11,646 11,646 11,646 
adj. R-sq 0.812 0.812 0.813 0.813 
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Notes: This table presents the OLS regressions of audit fees on corporate innovations. The 
dependent variable is a natural log of annual audit fees (lnAUDITFEE). t-statistics in parentheses 
are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm. Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Industry fixed effect is based on the Fama‒French 48 industry classification. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, using a two-sided t-test. 
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Table VI. Matched sample analysis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AFEE AFEE AFEE AFEE 
R&D 1.160*** 1.135*** 1.140*** 1.103*** 
 (-6.41) (6.32) (6.28) (6.11) 
lnPATENT 0.0886***  0.0971***                 
 (8.60)  (8.31)                 
lnCITE  0.0738***  0.0826*** 
  (9.03)  (8.93) 
IE_PATENT   -0.148*                 
   (-1.99)                 
IE_CITE    -0.0691**  
    (-2.79)    
ROA -0.109 -0.107 -0.111 -0.109 
 (-1.43) (-1.38) (-1.45) (-1.41)    
Size 0.502*** 0.503*** 0.500*** 0.501*** 
 (46.83) (47.72) (45.92) (46.69) 
Leverage 0.171** 0.172** 0.173** 0.174**  
 (2.88) (2.89) (2.92) (2.93) 
MB 0.00262 0.00243 0.00258 0.00243 
 (0.95) (0.88) (0.93) (0.88) 
Quick Ratio -0.0348*** -0.0350*** -0.0347*** -0.0348*** 
 (-7.13) (-7.19) (-7.13) (-7.17)    
Inherent 0.596*** 0.603*** 0.597*** 0.605*** 
 (8.22) (8.33) (8.24) (8.34) 
Loss 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 
 (5.75) (5.75) (5.72) (5.72) 
ICMW 0.385*** 0.384*** 0.385*** 0.384*** 
 (10.66) (10.64) (10.65) (10.64) 
Big4 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.172*** 0.171*** 
 (5.91) (5.89) (5.92) (5.90) 
NewAuditor -0.135*** -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.133*** 
 (-6.33) (-6.31) (-6.31) (-6.26)    
FOROPS 0.0981*** 0.0966*** 0.0984*** 0.0970*** 
 (4.33) (4.26) (4.34) (4.28) 
AUD_LAG 0.151*** 0.154*** 0.152*** 0.155*** 
 (5.51) (5.61) (5.52) (5.65) 
N_SEG 0.0143*** 0.0143*** 0.0143*** 0.0144*** 
 (9.81) (9.85) (9.84) (9.87) 
EXPERT 0.351*** 0.351*** 0.352*** 0.351*** 
 (4.44) (4.43) (4.45) (4.44) 
Constant 8.246*** 8.221*** 8.256*** 8.231*** 
 (60.87) (60.99) (60.74) (60.90) 
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10,966 10,966 10,966 10,966 
adj. R-sq 0.765 0.765 0.765 0.766 
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 Notes: This table presents OLS regression results for the propensity-score matched sample based on a client’s 
propensity to report R&D expenditure. Specifically, we estimate the following Logit model by year to estimate 
the propensity:  
RnD_Missing = γ0 + γ1ROA + γ2Size + γ3Leverage + γ4MB + γ5QuickRatio + γ6Inherent + 
γ7Loss +Σ Industry + ε.  
The dependent variable is the natural log of the annual audit fee (lnAUDITFEE). t-statistics in parentheses are 
calculated using standard errors clustered by firm. Variables are defined in the Appendix. Industry fixed effect 
is based on the Fama‒French 48 industry classification. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively, using a two-sided t-test.   
 
Table VII. Three-stage least squares regression. 
 AFEE  lnPATENT R&D 
AFEE   0.075**  0.015*** 
   (2.00)  (11.31) 
R&D 3.236***  17.219***   
 (11.57)  (30.36)   
lnPATENT 0.047***     
 (3.81)     
ROA 0.285***  1.251***  -0.113*** 
 (4.73)  (9.06)  (-20.35) 
Size 0.522***  0.595***  -0.012*** 
 (58.48)  (25.68)  (-13.91) 
Leverage -0.137***  -0.968***  0.010*** 
 (-3.69)  (-12.01)  (2.81) 
MB 0.011***  0.067***  -0.002*** 
 (5.38)  (15.60)  (-13.58) 
Quick Ratio -0.056***  0.082***  0.000 
 (-20.20)  (13.07)  (1.62) 
Inherent 0.304***  0.466***  -0.031*** 
 (6.22)  (4.15)  (-6.13) 
Loss -0.122***  -0.363***  0.036*** 
 (-6.02)  (-7.75)  (19.31) 
ICMW 0.520***  0.018   
 (19.36)  (0.28)   
Big4 0.102***     
 (4.47)     
NewAuditor -0.196***     
 (-11.09)     
FOROPS 0.088***  -0.069**  0.006*** 
 (7.04)  (-2.41)  (4.77) 
AUD_LAG 0.536***  -0.556***   
 (35.33)  (-15.22)   
N_SEG 0.010***  0.008***  0.000** 
 (12.39)  (4.35)  (-2.17) 
EXPERT 0.104*     
 (1.74)     
R&D_Missing   -0.380***   
   (-4.86)   
IND_PATENT     0.000*** 
     (14.95) 
Constant 7.781***  -2.693***  -0.081*** 
 (99.18)  (-7.95)  (-5.69) 
Industry/Year Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES 
N       11,593        11,593        11,593  
R-sq 0.714  0.171  0.247 
Chi2   31,424.47     6,711.08     4,040.45  
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Notes: This table presents the 3SLS regression results from estimating a system of equations 
having AFEE, LnPATENT, and R&D as endogenous variables. Auditor’s attributes (Big4, 
NewAuditor, and EXPERT) are used as instruments for AFEE. Indicator variable for missing 
R&D expenditure (R&D_Missing) is used as an instrument for LnPATENT. Industry average 
number of patents (IND_PATENT) is used as an instrument for R&D. z-statistics are presented 
in parentheses. Variables are defined in the Appendix. Industry fixed effect is based on the Fama‒
French 48 industry classification. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively, using a two-sided t-test.   
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Table VIII. Interaction effect with analyst coverage on audit fee. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AFEE AFEE AFEE AFEE 
R&D 1.261*** 1.255*** 1.189*** 1.202*** 
 (6.26) (6.25) (5.99) (6.03) 
Anal.Cov. 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 
 (0.68) (0.69) (1.09) (1.07) 
R&D × Anal.Cov. -0.153*** -0.149*** -0.162*** -0.161*** 
 (-4.17) (-4.07) (-4.46) (-4.44) 
lnPATENT 0.012  0.030*  
 (0.84)  (1.97)  
lnPATENT × Anal.Cov. 0.003  0.003  
 (1.55)  (1.33)  
lnCITE  0.012  0.023 
  (1.04)  (1.82) 
lnCITE x Anal.Cov.  0.002  0.002 
  (1.22)  (1.32) 
IE_PATENT   -0.14  
   (-1.24)  
IE_PATENT x Anal.Cov.   -0.021  
   (-1.03)  
IE_CITE    -0.028 
    (-0.70) 
IE_CITE x Anal.Cov.    -0.011 
    (-1.64) 
ROA -0.242** -0.240** -0.247*** -0.244** 
 (-3.27) (-3.23) (-3.33) (-3.29) 
Size 0.519*** 0.521*** 0.509*** 0.512*** 
 (48.11) (49.39) (43.92) (45.95) 
Leverage 0.145* 0.146* 0.155* 0.152* 
 (2.25) (2.26) (2.40) (2.35) 
MB 0.00297 0.00302 0.00236 0.00254 
 (1.29) (1.32) (1.03) (1.11) 
Quick Ratio -0.0413*** -0.0413*** -0.0408*** -0.0406*** 
 (-9.94) (-9.94) (-9.93) (-9.92) 
Inherent 0.799*** 0.804*** 0.801*** 0.807*** 
 (7.99) (8.04) (8.02) (8.07) 
Loss 0.0253 0.0257 0.024 0.0253 
 (1.19) (1.21) (1.13) (1.19) 
ICMW 0.414*** 0.414*** 0.418*** 0.418*** 
 (11.56) (11.55) (11.68) (11.71) 
Big4 0.0267 0.0251 0.0263 0.0269 
 (0.74) (0.69) (0.73) (0.74) 
NewAuditor -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.130*** -0.130*** 
 (-4.82) (-4.81) (-4.69) (-4.71) 
FOROPS 0.0473* 0.0467* 0.0482* 0.0479* 
 (2.30) (2.27) (2.35) (2.33) 
AUD_LAG 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 
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 (4.87) (4.85) (5.00) (4.99) 
N_SEG 0.00929*** 0.00936*** 0.00918*** 0.00922*** 
 (6.49) (6.55) (6.45) (6.47) 
EXPERT 0.434*** 0.435*** 0.433*** 0.435*** 
 (4.34) (4.34) (4.34) (4.36) 
Constant 8.520*** 8.503*** 8.589*** 8.560*** 
 (62.30) (62.38) (61.67) (62.08) 
Industry/Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N       10,004        10,004        10,004        10,004  
adj. R-sq         0.822          0.822          0.823          0.823  
 
Notes: This table presents OLS regression of audit fees on the interaction effect between corporate innovation 
and analyst coverage. The dependent variable was a natural log of audit fees (lnAUDITFEE). Analyst 
coverage (Anal.Cov.) is defined as the decile rank of the number of analysts following. t-statistics in 
parentheses are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm. Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Industry fixed effect is based on the Fama‒French 48 industry classification. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, using a two-sided t-test.   
 
 
 
